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iiiHighlights
This paper analyzes impacts of strategies used by wheat exporting countries on the
cross-sectional  variability in market shares.  A  logically consistent market share model is
used to explain impacts of credit guarantees, long-term agreements, PL480, and export
bonuses.  Results provide measures of the effects of strategies  on major wheat exporting
countries' market shares.  Specific conclusions are:
S  Export credit guarantees were important determinants of market shares in the early
1980s, particularly  for the United States and Canada.
*  The marginal  effect of strategies varies with the size of the exporting countries' market
share and with the distribution of competitor countries' market shares. In markets in
which the United States has a small market share or that it dominates, the marginal
effects of EEP or credit are negligible.
*  Elasticities  for PL480 and LTAs frequently did not differ significantly from zero.  In
the period  before 1985, a number of the own-credit elasticities were significant,
particularly  those for the  United States and Canada. However, values of these, and
for the cross-credit elasticities varied greatly, indicating that otherwise similar
programs had varying degrees of effectiveness.
*  Elasticities  varied greatly through time.  Most important was that in the period
following introduction of EEP, credit elasticities  were reduced in absolute value.
Structurally, EEP had the impact of increasing U.S. market shares and mitigating
effects of other strategies including that of the U.S. credit programs. EEP also had a
negative impact on competitor countries' market shares, primarily on Canada  and
Argentina.  However, the effect ofEEP on EC market shares was never significant.
A  number of important  policy implications can be discerned  from these results. First,
simply introducing and using a strategy does not necessarily increase market shares.
Strategies replicated  by competitors, either or with identical or other strategies, essentially
reduce the impacts of a strategy on the distribution of market shares.  Second, the marginal
effect of strategies in terms of market share all have a saturation effect--i.e.,  a point is
reached at which the marginal  effect is maximum, beyond which it diminishes to zero.  This
has important strategic implications  for export policy administration,  particularly  when
budget constraints  force allocation decisions across importing countries.  Third, these results
clearly indicate that the marginal  effects of credit (the only program which each of the
exporting countries has used) varies across exporting countries.  This suggests that the
programs must have important  features, which vary and/or are administered  more
strategically in some countries than others.
vIMPACTS  OF WHEAT  EXPORT STRATEGIES  ON  MARKET  SHARES'
William  W.  Wilson  and Seung-Ryong  Yang*"
Competition among exporting  countries  in the international  wheat  market has
intensified since the late  1970s;  and, in  response, the composition  of export strategies  has
changed.  All  major wheat exporting  countries have increased  their use of export strategies,
many of which  are differentiated  across  importing countries.  During the mid to late  1970s,
the primary export strategies were  PL480 for the United  States  and long-term  agreements
(LTAs)  and credit guarantees  for some  competitor countries.  During the early  1980s,  the
United States,  Australia,  and European countries  expanded  their use of credit guarantees  with
only infrequent  credit sales by Argentina.  In the late  1980s,  price subsidies  escalated;  and
other strategies  diminished  in relative  importance, though  they  have been maintained.'
Fundamental  objectives  of most  export strategies  are to increase total imports and/or to
alter the distribution  of market shares  among exporting countries.  However,  their impact  on
the distribution of market shares  depends on  the composition  and effectiveness of competitor
countries'  programs.  As program  administrators  and policymakers  review export strategies,
their comparative effectiveness  on  sales must  be evaluated  across  programs.2
The purpose  of this paper is  to determine  impacts of export  strategies for wheat on the
cross-sectional  variation  in market shares.  A logically consistent market share model  is
specified  and estimated,  and results  are  compared  through time,  across  export strategies,  and
across exporting  countries.  Comparisons  of elasticities  of different  export  strategies through
time and across  instruments  to those of competitor  countries  yield  conclusions  about  relative
impacts  on market  shares.  Critical to administration of any export  strategy is its impact on
market shares;  estimated elasticities are  a prerequisite  to optimally  adjusting the level  and use
of an export strategy.  The results provide  an understanding  of the spatial  distribution of
shares,  especially that component  attributable  to use of specific  strategies that would be of
interest to traders  and policy administrators.
*This research was conducted under a Special  USDA Grant #89-02580  titled,
"International  Marketing  and Trade Policies  for Northern  Grown  Crops."
"'Professor and  research  associate, respectively,  in  the Department  of Agricultural
Economics,  North Dakota  State University,  Fargo.
'See Grisby and  Dixit; Harris;  International  Wheat Council  (1990);  U.S. Department  of
Agriculture(1990);  and Smith for discussions  on use and operations of these programs.
2With the escalated use of credit programs, their operations  and effectiveness  have come
under scrutiny.  Harris compares the U.S.  credit programs to that of competitor countries,  and
Sorenson  et al.  (p. 73) suggests that the E.C.  "may  begin diversifying  use of export policy
instruments  including export  credits...."2
Impacts of alternative policies can be examined  and assessed only if concurrent
impacts of other export strategies  are included.  Past studies evaluating impacts  of policies  on
trade  flow include Anania,  Bohman,  and Carter and  Koo, Golz,  and Yang using spatial
equilibrium  models.  Koo and  Karemera  used pooled data with a supply/demand  equilibrium
specification  to determine factors  impacting  trade  flows.  Fleming used pooled data to
evaluate  impacts  of export  strategies on the cross-sectional  distribution  of rice flows.  This
study goes beyond  past approaches  by  analyzing multicompetitive  interactions of export
strategies used  by principal  exporting countries on market shares.
This paper is organized  as  follows.  In the second section,  we analytically  demonstrate
impacts of selected export strategies  on market shares in a two-country  model.  This simple,
theoretical  framework provides  insight about why  each exporting country provides  (or  adapts)
a specific trade  strategy and how  these trade  policies  affect the distribution  of market shares.
The third section develops  a  logically consistent  market share model used  in this study  for
empirical  analysis.  Estimation  procedures  and data sources  are presented in the  fourth and
fifth sections.  The sixth section  contains  the empirical  results, followed  by the conclusions.
Export Strategies and Market Shares
In this section, we demonstrate  analytically the impact  of each export strategy on the
buyer's import  allocation  decisions and  the distribution  of market shares,  assuming ceteris
paribus. For analytical  simplicity  and clarity,  we consider  an import  market with two
exporting  countries;  and the good is weakly  separable  from all  other goods in the commodity
bundle.  A base model  is developed  first, and expected  market shares  are derived.  These
results are compared  to expected  market shares stemming  from introduction of individual
export strategies.  Each export strategy impacts  the distribution  of market shares.  However,
competitors'  matching  strategies of similarly  administered  programs  mitigates impacts  of
other strategies.
Base Model  Let X={x,,x2,..,x,}'  be a vector of goods and P={p 1,p2,..,P,}'  be the
corresponding  world price vector  an importing country  faces.  The country imports  x,  from
two sources A and B and the two goods,  xA and x1B  (or products  in Armington's
terminology),  are  assumed perfect substitutes.  With a constrained budget Y, the buyer's
problem  is to
[1]  maximize  U =  U(X)
subject to  Y = P'X.
Since  x, is weakly separable  from all  other goods, the utility function  can be rewritten  as
[2]  U =  U(x1(x1AxB),X2,..,x),
where X,=XA+xiB  because the goods  are perfect substitutes by  assumption.3
A separable  utility function enables  two-stage  budgeting.  From the first order
condition of [1] with [2], the importer first determines  the optimal  level  of each good,
xi =x,(P,Y),  i=l,..,n.  At the second stage, the  levels of xA  and xB  are  determined  by
minimizing total expenditures  on imports:
[3]  minimize  M  = pxlA  + piiB
subject to  x1(pj,p2,..,p.,Y)  =  x1A + xB.
Because  the subutility  x,  is  linear and homogenous,  p,  is independent of x,  and, together with
Euler's theorem,  M=plx, (Armington).  This implies that  the cost minimizing curve  is
identical to the indifference  curve with infinite combinations of solutions  for xIA  and x,B
This result  is obvious  from the assumption that  the two products  are  homogeneous  and
have equal prices.  Since these products  are undifferentiated,  the expected  import from each
source would be  the same;  E(xA) =  E(x1B) = x1(p1,p2,..,p.,Y)/2  and the expected  market share
of each exporting country,  E(SA)=  E(SB)=  0.5.3
Export Subsidies  The importer's  decision problem  changes if country A offers a
direct price subsidy,  bA>0.  Specifically,  the buyer's budget  allocation  in  [3] becomes
[4]  minimize  M = (p1-bA)xlA + pxB
subject to  xl(pb-bAp 2,..,p.,Y)  = XA  +  xB,
where the optimal  level of x,  changes at  the first stage because of the introduction  of bA
Showing that the optimal  solution for (x A  xB) would  be (x1  0)  is straight  forward.  The
E(SA)  increases  to  1.0, capturing the whole  market.  Further, since the total market  size for x,
is larger than without the subsidy,  i.e., xl(pj-bAp 2,..,pa,Y)  > x,(p1,p2,..,p*,Y),  the expected
increase  in A's exports would  be xl(p,-bA,p2,..,p,,Y)  - xi(p2,p 2,..,p,,Y)/2.
If country  B also  provides  a direct price subsidy,  bB  = bA, the E(SA)=  E(SB)= 0.5  as in
the base  model since the minimum cost  line would  coincide with the indifference  curve.
However, the export quantity  for each country  increases  because of market expansion.  If
bA<bB,  then the optimal  solution is reversed;  and x^A=0  and xB=x,'.  Thus,  exporting
countries'  use of direct subsidies has the effect  of attracting buyer's imports or to negate
impacts of a  rival  country's subsidy.
31f the two products  are not  perfect substitutes,  a linearly homogeneous  but nonlinear
subutility  function  (e.g., Cobb-Douglas  function) could be assumed  and a unique solution
could be derived.  In the case where  x=(xiA)a(xiB)",  the market share  for A would be  a
while that for B would be 1-a.  However, this  requires  a priori knowledge  about the
functional form.  Further, analytical  solutions under the perfect substitutability  assumption  are
analogous to those  under any  homogeneous  subutility.4
Long-Term Agreements  (LTA)  Long-term  agreements  are  mechanisms  to guarantee
minimum  trade flows.4  In the case of wheat, importing countries  use LTAs to varying
degrees,  but are a primary  export strategy  of Canada.  Suppose the importing  country  agrees
to import Ix1A from country A under an LTA.  The importer's problem  becomes
[5]  minimize  M  = piXiA  + pXB
subject  to  x1(p1,p2,..,p,,Y)  =  xA  + xB and xA . lx1A
The feasible solution for x1A  and xB  would be Ix,iA1xAisx  and OxiBsxi-lxl^, E(XIA)=lXIA+(Xl-
lxA)/2,  and E(xlB)=(x1-lxA)/2.  The  LTA between the importing country and A increases  the
expected  market share  for A by lxA/2x1 and decreases  that for B by the same proportion.
The market size is unchanged  under LTAs.
Export Credit Programs  Export credit  programs (including  guarantees  and direct
credits)  for x,  expand the importing  country's budget constraint.5  This  allows the importer to
spend the released  foreign exchange  to increase  imports.  Let  cA be the credit A provides to
purchase xA.  Without considering the dynamic  nature  of repayment,  the buyer's problem  at
the first stage is
[6]  maximize  U=U(xl(x  A,XlB),X 2,..,XJ)
subject  to  Y=pxi,+p2x2+...+px.  and cA=px1 e,
where x1c is x, purchased  under credit  and x,. is x, purchased  with cash.  As long as
x(p 1,p2,*..,p,Y)>0  (i.e.,  no corner solution),  xl(pl,p2,..,p,,Y+cA)>xl(pl,p 2,..,p.,Y), the two
exporters  face an expanded  market.  The buyer's allocation problem  becomes
[7]  minimize  M=pixiA  + plx
subject to  x,(pl,p2,..,p,,Y+cA)=xIA+xlB  and xA=x 1A+x 1 ,
where xA is the cash purchase  of x,  from A and the credit purchase of x1, xA=cA/pi.  The
feasible solution  for xA  and xB would be x,  sxIA  1   and OSx1  Sx1-xxA.  Expected  exports
from the two countries  are E(x A)=x  A+(xI-xicA)/2  and E(xIB)=(xI-x,~A)/2.  Export credits given
by A expands the market  size for x,, increases  E(SA)  by x,^A/2x,,  and  decreases  E(SB)  by the
same proportion.
O 4 f particular  importance  in the case  of wheat  are bilateral  agreements,  which "are merely
supply arrangements  whereby the exporting country  assures itself of a firm  customer  for its
grain  over a period  and the importing country  safeguards  its source of supply" (Sewell,  p. 96).
As such, LTAs  could be interpreted  similar to vertical  relationships in the industrial
organization  literature  (Vickers and  Waterson).
SFor a detailed  description of uses of credit  programs  in international  trade, see Harris;
Yang and Wilson;  International  Wheat Council.5
Thus  far, we  have  analytically demonstrated  the ceteris paribus impact of each  export
strategy on buyer's  import allocation  decisions.  In practice,  more than two exporting
countries exist whose products may not be perfectly  substitutable  and each operates  a
different  mix of export strategies.  In this case,  analytical  solutions would be extremely
complicated,  if not impossible.  The marginal  effect of each export strategy in  a
multicompetitive  framework can be analyzed  empirically with  a market share  model  as
developed  in the next section.
Market Share Theory:  The Attraction  Model
An exporting  country's market share is  an indicator of sales performance  in a
particular  market.  Market  share  analysis is used to assess impacts  of export strategies that
influence  purchase decisions.6  Exporting countries use strategies to increase  their products'
"attractiveness"  and,  in turn, shares in particular markets.  The  impact of a country's  export
strategy  depends on the effectiveness  of its own programs  and composition  and effectiveness
of competitor  countries'  programs.  However,  strategies  used  to change  the distribution  of
market shares have  the impact of mitigating  effectiveness  of other strategies,  own and
competitor.
We specify  an  attraction  model  (Bell,  Keeney  and  Little; Kotler;  Karnani;  Kuehn,
McGuire,  and Weiss;  Lilien  and Kotler) to empirically  analyze  the impact of each strategy  on
exporting  countries'  market shares.  In this  model, each product  has  its own attraction  to the
importing country which is determined  by  characteristics  and attributes.  Relative
attractiveness  determines  the distribution  of market shares.7
Let  Si be the market share of product  i, i=l,...,m,  in an importing  country  and A, be
product i's attraction,  which buyers  have toward each competing  product.  With four axioms,
Bell,  Keeney  and Little show that  the market share of product  i can be expressed  as the
attraction model:
[8]  Si = A/A.
6The marketing  literature refers  to this as the  marketing  mix, comprised  of price
discounts,  advertising etc.
7This model  is used extensively  in  marketing research  to assess  impacts of firm  marketing
efforts on shares.  Other studies using market share models  include Wilson and  Gallagher;
that Houck and Ryan;  Sowter, Gator, and  Granger.  However,  we  are not  aware of any studies
which have  explicitly incorporated  export strategies  in a  logically consistent market  share
model  derivable  from purchaser behavior to analyze their impacts on the distribution  of
market shares.6
This model  also can be derived  from Kotler's fundamental  market share  theorem with an
assumption that the attraction  of product  i depends  on the  product's  marketing  mix:
[9]  Ai =f(Z,;p),
where Z, is the vector of marketing effort  and  P,  is the corresponding vector of
responsiveness.
Among alternatives,  two functional  forms are used  extensively  in the literature.  The
first  is the multiplicative  competitive  interaction  model  (MCI  model) in which  f(.)  is
multiplicative  in variables.  The  other is the  multinomial  logit  model (MNL model)  in which
variables  are exponentially  transformed  in the MCI  model.  Gruca  and  Sudharshan  show that
the MCI model  is more  useful in equilibrium  analyses.  However, if data  for marketing
variables contain zeros,  i.e.,  no marketing  effort  for some periods or  regions, the MNL model
is more  appropriate.  This study uses  the MNL model since values  for some export strategies
are zero.
Following  Cooper and  Nakanishi,  we specify  a  fully extended  model  in which
attraction for product  i and,  therefore,  market share  is  a function  of its own strategies  and
those of all other  exporting countries.  The  fully extended  MNL attraction  model is
[10]  A. =  exp(Boi  +  3 2: 34ZJ +  .), and
Si, = A)-,
where  Z7  is the k'  strategy variable in Zi and  B8i  is the corresponding  parameter  for Z,  in Si.
The intercept  B1 is product-specific  and denotes  the attraction  of the product,  which is
independent  of export strategies.  Ei is  the disturbance term.
The market  share, by definition,  should be non-negative,  sum to one (adding  up), and
fall within the interval  [0,1].  These conditions  are referred to as  "logical  consistency"  (Naert
and Bultez).  The  attraction  model  in [10]  automatically  satisfies these conditions.  Since A, is
strictly positive,  so is
Si and  jS, =  1i(A/jAi)  =  1.
The marginal  effect of each export  policy on market  shares is obtained  by
[11]  as/az4 =  ((1-S)8 4 - Sij  -2**Sa)S,
The first term on  the right-hand  side, (1-S,)B0, is the direct  effect of Z,  on S,, while the
remaining two terms  indicate the sum of indirect  effects  through other market shares.  When
i=j,  [11]  indicates  the own effect.  In what follows,  even if B13  is negligible,  the overall effect
can be sizable  through the sum of indirect  effects  on other market shares.  Note  also that
dS./aZ 1  may differ in  sign  from  fB  if Bti is  nearly zero  and Sji  B  is smaller than Zs,Sh,8,.
In other words, if product i is  relatively  isolated so that the effect of Zy is negligible  on Si but7
is larger on the markets other than Sj, then Z,  may have an opposite  effect on Si.  As such,
the fully extended  attraction  model  captures  complicated  intercountry  effects of strategies  on
international  wheat market shares.
The sum of marginal  effects of Z.  on  all  market shares  is zero.  This implies that  an
increase(s)  in market share(s)  from  a change  in export strategy  is necessarily  drawn from
competitors'.  This follows the definition  that the  market shares sum to one before or after the
change.
The model  is  analogous  to random  utility theory and  explicitly  accounts for impacts of
strategies on utility and, therefore,  purchase  behavior and  market shares.  The functional  form
is appealing because  it allows  for a saturation effect to emerge  for each export strategy.
Specifically,  the marginal effect,  aS/aZ/Z  and, therefore,  the elasticity  increases with increases
in market share,  reaches  a maximum,  and then decreases  with  additional  increases  in market
share.  However,  the relative  importance  of this  effect is determined  empirically.
Model  Estimation and  Specification
The attraction  model  in  [10] is inherently  nonlinear in parameters,  which may
compound estimation problems.  However,  Cooper and  Nakanishi  developed a procedure  to
estimate  the model  through  a log-centering  transformation.  With this transformation,  the
attraction  model in  [10] can  be rewritten  as
[12]  log(si)  =  Bo1  +  5kLjBiZIj  + Ei,  i=l,...,m,
where  si  is the log-centered  si,  which  is s/si,, where  sil  is the geometric mean of si over i,  and
B1i  = Bi-Bo'3 B0  k =8a-.  i,  =  Ei-E  where 8', 13', and  E"  are arithmetic  means of Bio,  Bk,  and
ei,  respectively,  calculated over i.
Since  each equation  has the same  independent  variables,  OLS  applied to each
individual  equation  yields the best unbiased linear estimates  of B  under standard  assumptions
on the disturbance  term,  Ei*.  The estimated  B4'  is not the same as  Bki but is the difference
between  Bi and its average  over i, B-8~'.  Thus, the estimate  cannot be directly  used to
evaluate  strategy impacts.  However,  Cooper and Nakanishi  demonstrated  that the elasticity,
using  B13i,  is identical  to that using B3.
Comparing effectiveness  of export strategies  is convenient with elasticities.  In matrix
notation, elasticities of market  shares with respect to export strategy are
[13]  E  = ZB(I,-JS)',
where E is a (km  x m) matrix of elasticities,  Z is a  (km x  kmn)  diagonal  matrix  of strategy
variables,  B is a (km x  m)  matrix of parameters,  I,  is  an (m x  m) identity matrix,  J,  is  an (m
x m)  matrix of ones,  and S is a (m  x m)  diagonal  matrix  of market  shares.8
In this paper we present elasticities  of export strategies  and test their significance.
However,  t-values associated  with the estimated  B8* do not test the null  hypothesis of Ho:
Bk=0 but of Ho:  Bk4=1Ba.  As an alternative, we  test the  null  hypothesis, Ho:  ei4=0, where
e4=0 is an element  of the elasticity  matrix E  in [12].  The basis for the statistical  tests on
elasticities  is developed  in the appendix.
Export strategies  are explanatory  variables in the attraction  model.  These  include
price  discounts,  credit programs,  and long-term  agreements.  Use of each varies  across
exporting countries  and through time.  Variables  included  for the United States  are  exports
under credit  guarantees,  PL480,  LTAs,  and EEP bonuses.  Other countries provide price
discounts.  However,  this information  is  not publicly  available for Canada and Australia  due
to  a lack of transparency.  Export price  subsidies  are used extensively  for the EC, however,
they are  equal across importing countries  (Sorenson, et  al.  p. 72).  Thus, only credit
guarantees  and LTAs  are included  for Canada, Australia,  and Argentina  and credit for the EC.
To capture geographical  effects, such  as distance  and potential  intercountry  relationships  from
foreign policies,  regional  dummy variables were  included  for Africa,  Asia, South America,
and Europe.
Data Description
Market shares  for each  importing country were  derived  from  wheat shipment data
reported  in USDA Grain  Market News  and in annual  reports of the  International  Wheat
Council, Australian  Wheat  Board, and Canadian  Wheat  Board.  Data on wheat export
shipments under PL480 were taken  from USDA  annual  reports.  The value used  for EEP was
an annual  average  of EEP bonus for importing countries  and were taken  from Foreign
Agricultural  Service news releases source.
Sales under  export credit  guarantees  from each exporting country  to each  importing
country were taken from  various sources.  United  States shipments  under credit  guarantees
were the sum of sales to each importing  country under the GSM-102,  GSM-103,  and  Blended
Credit  (when used) programs  taken from  annual  reports of the Foreign Agricultural  Service.
Canadian data were taken from  Canadian Wheat  Board Annual  Reports.  Australian  and
Argentine  data were taken from the International  Wheat  Council (IWC)  and supplemented
with discussions with program  administrators.  Aggregate  guarantees  of all  EC exporting
countries  that the  International  Wheat Council  (IWC)  reported  were used  for the  EC.  A data
series of LTAs was  derived  from data contained  in annual  reports of the International  Wheat
Council and  Canadian Wheat  Board.  For each year, the quantity of wheat under LTA
between  each  importing and exporting  country was derived  and used in the analysis.
Cross-section  data for  114 countries  were developed;  however, because of missing
information, only  97 countries  could  be used in the analysis.  Separate  equation systems were
estimated  for each commodity  marketing  year from  1979/80 through  1989/90.9
Among these export strategies  and importing countries  comprising  our sample, the
export strategy  the United States  used most frequently  was PL480.  Use of PLA80 has
increased from  21  countries  in  1982 to 34 in 1989.  EEP increased  from  nil prior before 1985
to 15 recipient  countries  in  1989.  Use of credit  guarantee programs by the United States  has
also increased  dramatically,  from  nil  in  1979 to 22 in  1989.  Other countries  have used credit
guarantees  less frequently.  The EC,  Canada,  and Australia  used credit guarantees  in 5,  4,  and
3 countries,  respectively.  Canada  used LTAs  most extensively,  followed  by Australia  and
Argentina.  The United States used LTAs with only 2  importing countries and  the EC with
none.
Results
Fully extended  market share  models were  estimated  for each year from  1979 through
1989.  Due to the volume of analyses, we  present statistical  results for 1979,  1982,  1986,  and
1989.  These years  reflect changing model structures  (i.e.,  included  export strategies)  through
time:  1979  having few operative  export  strategies;  1982 having greater use of credit
guarantees;  1986 reflecting  incorporation  of EEP as an export strategy;  and  1989, the last
period of the sample data.
Statistical Estimates  Statistical  estimates  for each  exporting country  and year are
shown  in Table  1.  Many of the parameters are  statistically significant.  Due to the log-
centering transformation,  the t-ratios are  interpreted  as a test that  84=B,  '.8
The  intercepts  directly measure  the level  of attraction independent  of strategies.
Technically,  if the value  of all  export strategies were nil, these would be  an  index of relative
attractiveness.  These  reflect quality differentials  and other effects  not explicitly  included  in
the model  specification.
The intercepts  for each  importing  region were  derived  for each exporting  country
(using the dummy variables)  and  are shown in Table  2 for 1979  and  1989.  In 1979,  the
import markets with the greatest  attraction  for both  the United States  and  Canada were  in
Europe.  The region with the least  attraction  for U.S. wheat  in  both years was Africa.  In
1989, South America  as  a region  had the greatest attraction  for U.S.  and Canadian wheat.
Over time, Europe's  attraction to  U.S. wheat  decreased  and Canada's  increased.  Africa was
the region with the greatest  attraction  for EC wheat in both  periods.  In  1979, the import
market with the greatest  attraction to Australia was Africa but  shifted  to Asia in  1989.
Similar  shifts occurred  for Canada's wheat in Asia during this period, but attraction to U.S.
wheat  in the Asian  market decreased.
8Significant  t-values  in this context indicate that  a country's export strategy is  more
effective than  average if  positive, as represented  by Bg'.Wable  1.  StatLetistal leti-ates  of  tast  Narlt  SMhare Models
1979  1982  1906  1999























































U.S.  Canada  Ans  Arg  NC
1.37*  1.23*
(2.09)  (2.56)
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U.S.  Canada  Au•  Arg  DC
0.35  2.22*  -1.35*  -2.22*
(0.64)  (4.44)  (3.42)  (6.73)
-0.71  -1.46*  -0.48  0.12
(0.93)  (2.11)  (0.66)  (0.25)
0*21  -1.66*  0.97*  0.20
(0.27)  (2.37)  (1.76)  (0.44)
2.95'*  -2.25*  -0.74  1.12*
(3.83)  (3.27)  (1.35)  (2.45)
0.03  0.04  0.12  -0.06
(0.11)  (0.17)  (0.70)  (0.41)
0.03  0.04  0.13  -0.29
(0.05)  (0.07)  (0.30)  (0.78)
-0.06  0.02  0.62*  0.30
(0.12)  (0.06)  (1.63)  (1.04)
-0.32  -0.63  -0.32  1.10*
(0.54)  (1.17)  (0.76)  (3.11)
-0.00  0.09  -0.29  0.19
(0.27)  (0.33)  (1.37)  (1.11)
0.83*  -0.57  0.23  -0.45*
(1.99)  (1.52)  (0.78)  (1.82)
0.10  0.05  -0.05  -0.01
(1.46)  (0.82)  (1.02)  (0.17)
0.01  -0.13  -0.05  -0.01
(0.01)  (0.35)  (0.17)  (0.03)
-0.19  0.01  -0.76  0.57
(0.19)  (0.01)  (1.14)  (1.00)
-0.17  0.09  '-0.05  0.29*
(1.11)  (0.64)  (0.49)  (3.23)
0.19*  -0.07  -0.03  -0.05
(2.06)  (0.88)  (0.50)  (0.84)
0.35  0.22  0.32  0.35
* Zndicatoc  significant  at  the  10% leel.
0.25  -0.17  0.23  -0.22*
(1.23)  (0.94)  (1.40)  (1.66)
0.01  0.03  -0.01  0.04
(0.82)  (0.64)  (0.21)  (0.89)
0.09  0.23*  -0.04  -0.07
(0.62)  (1.79)  (0.30)  (0.67)
0.17  -0.43  -0.13  0.04
(0.51)  (1.48)  (0.48)  (0.19)


































Table 2.  Intercepts Adjusted  to Regional Dummies for Each Model:  1979 and  1989
U.S.  Canada  Australia  Argentina  EC
1979  Europe  2.64  .98  -2.26  -1.91  .55
Africa  .26  -.03  1.22  -1.8  2.79
Asia  1.6  -.64  1.01  -2.48  .50
So. America  1.62  -.55  -2.17  .13  1.61
1989  Europe  .35  2.22  -1.35  -2.22  .99
Africa  -.36  .76  -1.83  -2.1  3.52
Asia  .14  .56  -.38  -2.02  1.26
So. America  3.30  -.03  -2.09  -1.1  -.08
Marginal Effects  The marginal  effect,  aOS/aZ,  of an export strategy  on market
shares provides one way to demonstrate  the effects of strategies  on market shares.  These
effects depends  on the distribution of competitor  country  market shares  and, therefore,  cannot
be generalized.  For illustration purposes,  the empirical  relationship  between the marginal
effect  of selected U.S.  export strategies and  market share are  shown in  Figures  1 and 2.
The marginal  effect of credit guarantees  during  1982  and 1989  are  shown in Figure  1.
Each observation  represents  particular importing countries.  In  1982, the marginal effect was
maximum  at about 0.06/unit.  The effect of credit is greatest  for countries in which the U.S.
market  share is about 55%.  For countries  in which  the U.S. market share  differs from  about
55%,  the marginal  effect of credit guarantees  diminishes  confirming the saturation  effect
embedded  in the empirical  model.  The  difference  in marginal  effects between observations
with similar values of U.S. market shares is attributed  to differences  in the distribution of Sj,
for all j - U.S. in those markets.  In contrast,  marginal  effects of credit in  1989  are  less
systematic,  and many  are close to zero.  These  illustrate  impacts  of other strategies,  namely
EEP, which have  the impact of mitigating impacts  of other export  strategies.
Marginal  effects of EEP  are  calculated  for both 1985 and  1989  and shown in  Figure 2.
In 1985,  the marginal  effects were generally  constant  indicating negligible saturation at about
0.15/unit.  The marginal  effect of EEP  in  1989  is more  systematic  and  has a much  greater
saturation effect.  It reached  a maximum  at about 0.65/unit, with a  U.S. market  share of about
50%.  The marginal  effect of EEP  diminishes in  countries with either larger or smaller U.S.
market shares.  These graphs  illustrate  an important feature  of the impact of export  strategies
on market shares.  In particular,  marginal  effects  increase  from  nil  as the  level of the market
share  increases, reaches  a maximum,  and diminishes  in markets with shares  greater than
about  50%.
91n  a simple  effects  market share  model, the  maximum would be precisely  at .5.
However,  in the  fully extended model,  the maximum is an empirical  question, depending on
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Elasticities  were calculated  at mean  values  and are  shown  in Tables  3 through 6.10
First, we discuss impacts of specific  export strategies  and make more general observations
across  individual  exporting countries.
Elasticities  for LTAs were  generally insignificant."  The own-elasticity  was
significant  only for Argentina  in  1989.  Use of LTAs by  all other exporting countries  only
had periodic significant  cross effects.  These suggest  that, in general,  LTAs do not  have a
great  influence on the distribution of export  market shares.
The own elasticity for PL480  did not differ significantly  from zero in  1979,  1982,  or
1986.  However, there were important  and significant  negative cross effects of PL480 on
Argentina in three of the years,  Canada in  one year, and Australia  in two years.  Though
PL480 was normally  not significant,  it had the greatest  negative  impact on Argentina.
Canada was the only  exporter with an active credit guarantee  program  in  1979, but
that impact was not significant  (Table 3).  In  1982, own-credit  elasticities  for the United
States,  Canada,  and Argentina  were significant.  U.S. credit  allocations  increased own-market
share  and reduced  that of Canada,  but impacts  on other countries'  market shares were  not
significant.  Cross-credit elasticities  differed  for these two  countries'  programs,  indicating that
Canada's program  has  a greater negative  impact on the U.S. market  share than the  negative
impact that the U.S. program  has on Canada's  market share.  In 1986,  all  own and cross
elasticities were lower  in absolute  value.  The  U.S.  program did  not have  a significant  impact
on the distribution  of market  shares in  1986.  However,  for other countries  own credit
elasticities were significant.
"For  comparison,  elasticities  calculated  at the mean  of nonzero values of independent
variables  are larger.  Some of these are shown  later in the paper  for comparison.  However,
general conclusions  made  in this study are  the same, using elasticities  calculated  at either
point.
"Given  the operations of the U.S. marketing system,  U.S. LTAs would be unlikely to
lend themselves  as effective  compared  to those of competitor countries.  However, this is not
substantiated  in these results.15
Table 3.  Market Share Elasticities With  Respect to Export Strategies:  1979
Market  Share
U.S.  Canada  Australia  Argentina  EC
Credit:  Canada  -0.048  0.024  0.054  0.077  0.047
PL480  0.050  -0.088  0.042  -0.107*  -0.063
LTA:  U.S.  0.011  0.024  -0.003  0.025  -0.042
Canada  0.040  0.116  -0.029  -0.046  0.132
Argentina  0.016  -0.106  -0.045  -0.010  0.052
Note:  Elasticities  were derived at means.
* (**)  Indicates significance  at  a  10%  (5%) level.
Table 4.  Market Share Elasticities With Respect  to Export Strategies: 1982
Market  Share
U.S.  Canada  Australia  Argentina  EC
Credit:  U.S.  0.286*  -0.269*  0.010  0.098  -0.253
Canada  -0.443*  0.237  0.215  -0.023  0.387
Australia  0.379  -0.827  0.401  0.556  -0.313
Argentina  -0.006  -0.031  -0.016  0.068*  0.012
EC  -0.032  -0.035  0.004  -0.019  0.053
PL480  0.228  -0.095  -0.309*  -0.307*  -0.112
LTA:  U.S.  1.270  -2.637  0.805  1.431  -1.023
Canada  0.280  0.401  -0.567*  -0.403  -0.290
Australia  -1.398  2.624*  -0.737  -1.336  1.031
Argentina  -0.363  0.513  -0.044  -0.191  0.273
Note:  Elasticities were  derived  at means.
* (**)  Indicates  significance  at  a 10%  (5%) level.16






















With Respect  to Export Strategies:  1986
Market  Share
Canada  Australia  Argentina
0.024  -0.021  0.079

























EEP  0.172*  -0.315*  -0.099  -0.233*  -0.053
Note:  Elasticities were  derived  at means.
* (**)  Indicates  significance  at  a  10% (5%)  level.







U.S.  Canada  Aus
t:  U.S.  0.022  0.030  0.
Canada  0.012  0.021  0.
Australia  0.014  0.049  0.
Argentina  -0.005  -0.033  -0.
EC  -0.026  0.022  -0.
0  0.194*  -0.258*  -0.
U.S.  0.071  0.030  -0.
Canada  -0.070  -0.165  -0.
Australia  -0.039  0.008  -0.
Argentina  -0.015  0.172  0.
0.276*  -0.215  -0.
Elasticities were derived at  means.
* (**)  Indicates  significance  at  a  10% (5%) level.


































Own-credit elasticities  for the EC were never significant except  in  1986.  The results
also  suggest that during 1986,  competitor credit programs  were administered  more
strategically  than U.S. programs,  resulting in greater increases  in their own market  shares.  In
general,  own-credit  elasticities for competitor countries exceeded  that of the United States,
particularly  in 1986 and  1989.  These results confirm  Harris'  allegation that features  of
competitor programs  increase  their effectiveness  relative  to that of the United  States.  This
reflects  that different countries'  programs, which are otherwise  similar, are administered  in
such  a way  to have differing  degrees of effectiveness  (see Harris for a discussion  in the case
of credit guarantees).  In addition,  these  are  in contrast to Skully, who  assumed that credit
guarantees  did not influence  market  shares.
The change  in elasticities through time also reflects the impact of the changing
structure  of competition,  namely introduction  of EEP.  The impact  of this is to mitigate
influences  of previously existing export  strategies.  To illustrate, the  models were estimated
for each year from  1979 to  1989,  and elasticities for credit (own  credit)  and EEP (own and
cross effects)  were  derived at means of the nonzero  independent  variables  (Table  7).  United
States  own credit  elasticity was significant  and elastic before  EEP was introduced  in  1985.
After  1985, it rapidly declined  in value.  Credit  elasticities for Australia were  greater in  1981
than  U.S. elasticities,  and  Canadian elasticities were  greater in  1983  and  1984, indicating that
in those years,  competitor country  programs were  more effective  relative to U.S. credit
programs.
Table 7.  Market Share Elasticities  of Credit and EEP:  1979-1989
Own Credit  EEP
U.S.  Canada  Aust.  U.S.  Canada  Aus  Arg  EC
1979  -.31
1980  1.56*  -2.22  .28
1981  1.36  .69  17.68*
1982  1.44*  3.79  19.28
1983  1.21*  3.63*  .47
1984  1.75*  5.18*  2.94
1985  .67  .95  5.04  1.25*  -1.39  -.60  -1.65*  -.44
1986  .31  2.21*  6.23*  1.37*  -2.54*  -.80  -1.88*  -.43
1987  .07  2.11  6.56*  1.41*  -1.97*  -.92  -1.09*  -.60
1988  .51  4.84*  15.77  1.51*  -1.19  -1.65*  -.56  -1.53
1989  .10  .13  9.14*  1.78*  -1.39  -.88  -1.06  -1.09
Note:  Elasticities were derived  at means of non-zero  observations.
* (**)  Indicates  significance  at a 10%  (5%) level.18
Introduction of EEP  in  1985 had several  important  effects.  First, it increased  U.S.
market share in the  importing countries where  it was used.  Second,  it diminished the effects
of the U.S.  credit program.  Third, it had a negative  impact on competitor  countries'  market
shares,  primarily on  Canada  and Argentina.  Australian  market shares were  impacted only in
1988.  Its effect on EC market shares has been negligible  and, in fact, never differed
significantly  from zero supporting Anania,  Bohman,  and Carter.  The negative  impact on
competitor elasticities  has diminished.  For example, the cross elasticity of EEP on  Canada's
market share was -2.54  and -1.97  and significant  in  1986 and  1987 but  has decreased  in
(absolute)  value and has become  insignificant  in  1989.  Similar conclusions  can be made
regarding the  impact of EEP on Argentina.
When these results were compared  over time, the frequency  of use of export strategies
increased,  and the frequency of their elasticities'  being significant  increased.  Specifically,  in
1979  none of trade strategies  had significant  effects on "own-country"  market shares,  and only
one had a significant cross effect.  However,  in later years,  more strategies were used and,
apparently,  were being used more strategically  as reflected  by the greater occurrence  of
elasticities,  which differed  significantly  from zero.
Conclusions
All major wheat exporting countries  have  increased  use of export  strategies, which are
differentiated  across importing  countries.  These include credit guarantees,  long-term
agreements,  PL480, and the U.S.  Export Enhancement  Program.  Most export  strategies  are
administered  to increase total  imports and/or  to change the distribution of market shares
among exporting countries.  However,  their impact  on the distribution  of market shares
depends on the composition  and effectiveness  of competitor countries'  programs.  A crucial
determinant of any analysis  of export strategies  is their comparative  impact  on market shares.
A logically consistent market  share  model  is specified and  estimated.  Specifically,  a
fully extended  attraction model  is used to allow explicit introduction of export strategies to
impact purchase  decisions.  Exporting countries  use strategies  to increase their commodities'
attractiveness  and  market shares.  However,  impacts of strategies depend  on use of other
strategies,  and composition  and  effectiveness  of competitor  countries'  strategies.  In this
model,  relative  attractiveness  determines  the distribution of market shares.  The specific
functional  form used allows  for a saturation  effect of a strategy  after some level is  achieved.
The intercepts (adjusted  for regional effects)  measure  attraction independent  of the
export strategies.  Comparison  of these values indicate  some important  shifts in relative
attraction to exporters by  importing regions.  Most  notable  is that over time,  the attraction of
European  markets  to U.S. wheat  decreased  and that of Canada  increased.  Similarly, Asia's
attractiveness  to wheat  from Canada  and Australia increased  between  1979  and  1989, but its
attraction to U.S. wheat in this market decreased.19
The marginal  effect of strategies varies with the size of the exporting countries'
market share  and with the distribution of competitor  countries'  market shares.  In most cases,
the marginal  effect of export strategies  is maximum in countries where the exporting  country
has a market share of about  50%.  In markets  in which  the United  States has a small market
share or that it dominates,  the marginal  effects of EEP  or credit are  negligible.
Elasticities were  derived  for each  strategy  and exporting country.  Generally,
elasticities  for PL480 and LTAs  frequently  did not differ significantly  from zero.  In the
period  before  1985,  a number of the own-credit  elasticities were  significant, particularly  those
for the United  States and Canada.  However, values of these,  and for the cross-credit
elasticities varied greatly, indicating that otherwise similar programs  had varying degrees  of
effectiveness.  In addition, these elasticities  varied greatly through  time.  Most important  was
that in the period following  introduction of EEP, credit elasticities were  reduced  in absolute
value.  Structurally,  EEP  had the impact of increasing  U.S. market  shares  and mitigating
effects of other strategies including  that of the U.S.  credit programs.  EEP also had  a negative
impact on competitor  countries'  market shares,  primarily on  Canada and Argentina.  However,
the effect of EEP on EC market shares was never significant.
A number of important policy  implications  can be discerned  from these results.
First, simply introducing  and using a strategy  does  not necessarily  increase  market shares.
Strategies  replicated  by competitors,  either or with identical  or other strategies,  essentially
reduce  the impacts  of a strategy on  the distribution  of market shares.  Second,  the marginal
effect  of strategies  in terms of market share  all  have a saturation  effect--i.e.,  a point is
reached  at which the marginal  effect  is maximum, beyond which it diminishes to zero.  This
has important strategic implications for export policy  administration,  particularly  when budget
constraints  force  allocation  decisions across  importing  countries.  Third, these results  clearly
indicate that the marginal  effects of credit (the only program  which each of the  exporting
countries has used) varies across  exporting countries.  This suggests that the programs must
have important  features, which vary  and/or are  administered more strategically  in some
countries than others.
Export strategy  impacts were  discussed  in terms of the marginal  effect of that strategy
on market shares,  or a  related measure,  its elasticity.  Neither of these measures  captures any
notion of costs of strategies  and, therefore,  could  not be used strictly  alone to make  an
allocation  decision, or to evaluate overall  performance  of each strategy.  Nonetheless,  the
measures  in this paper provide  a foundation  for estimating the additional  market  share
associated  with  each strategy,  which  would be  an important element of the policy  analysis.21
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The mathematical  expression in  [12]  is for an elasticity matrix.  The left-hand  side is a
matrix of random variables.  For convenience, we  transform the matrix into a vector, using
the stacking operator:
[Al] vec(E)  = vec(XB(I.-J.S)')  =  [(I.-J.S)@X]vec(B),
where  vec(E)  =  vec(ei e2 ... e.) where  ei is the i'  column of E and  @ denotes  the Kronecker
product.  The covariance  matrix of vec(E)  is
[A2] 1.)= [(I,-J.S)@X]•,,)[(I,-JS)@X]',
where  ) =  (Z'(X'@IT)Z)"1  where I  is the covariance  matrix of e;,  i=l,...,m, and  Z =
(I,@Z) where Z, is  a (T x (km))  matrix of explanatory variables  of equation  [14],  and T is
the sample size.  The t-values  for the elasticities can  be obtained through the  element division
of vec(E)  by the square root of the diagonal  element  of 2vcE).